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Approximate numerical estimates are developed in order to quantify a variety of aspects of the 
arms race. The results ofthese calculations are consistent with either direct observations or with 
more sophisticated calculations. This paper will cover some of the following aspects of the arms 
race: (1) the electromagnetic pulse (EMP); (2) spy satellites; (3) ICBM accuracy; (4) NAVSTAR 
global positioning satellites; (5) particle and laser beam weapons; (6) the neutron bomb: and (7) war 
games. 
INTRODUCTION 
The initial paper in this series) dealt with a number of 
aspects of the arms race such as the Spartan (high altitude) 
and Sprint (low altitude) and antiballistic missile (ABM) 
systems; the tradeoff between accuracy and yield, and its 
impact on superhardening missile sites and on multiple in­
dependently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV); cost-ex­
change ratios; and other issues. Almost a decade has passed 
and the arms race continues. Because of advances in tech­
nology, the arms race has become more of a qualitative 
(new technologies) rather than a quantitative (numbers of 
launchers) arms race. The newer technologies of cruise 
missiles and the mobile MX missiles have exacerbated the 
issue of "adequate" verification that is one of the touch­
stones of arms control.agreements. Further technological 
advances in the areas ofincreased missile accuracy through 
the use of NAVSTAR satellites, laser and particle beam 
weapons, the neutron bomb, and other technologies could 
create additional layers of political and technological un­
certainty. 
It is not the purpose of this paper to discuss the broader 
issues ofwar and peace such as action-reaction arms esca­
lation, institutional pressures to increase armaments, a de­
sire to have the same armaments as ones opponent (mirror 
imaging), the historical factors which determine each na­
tion's insecurities about its national security, a description 
of the various arms control treaties, the difference between 
sufficiency and parity, the connection between horizontal, 
and vertical proliferation, and the tradeoffs between offen­
sive-defensive, first-strike-second-strike, tactical-strate­
gic weapons, and other factors. These issues have been 
widely discussed by numerous authors2 over the years; re­
cently Schroeer and Dowling3 have compiled an extensive 
reference list on these broader subjects as well as the techni­
cal ones. The scope ofthis paper will not focus on these very 
important (often subjective) issues, but, rather, it will deal 
with some of the basic physics (objective and calculable) 
factors involved in the development of some of the ad­
vanced technologies. 
Recently, W0llett4 in an article entitled, "Physics and 
Modern Warfare: The Awkward Silence," has pointed out 
that 
the typical general education course in physics or phys­
ical science offers the student a misleading impression of 
the interaction ofscience and society. Such courses tend 
to stress the benefits to man which follow progress in 
science (as well as the intellectual excitement and intrin­
sic beauty of pure science). Little mention is made of the 
serious problems man is presently faced with, problems 
directly related to progress made in science. 
This paper and its predecessor are an attempt to respond to 
this challenge. Our goal is to encourage a dispassionate 
methodology for analyzing the technical aspects of these 
problems which emphasizes the basic science involved 
without using overly sophisticated mathematics and phys­
ics. Only by first considering these difficult technical prob­
lems can we hope to make some progress towards develop­
ing viable solutions. Our calculations on the physics of the 
arms race will use only widely accepted numerical param­
eters; our results agree with either direct observation or 
with more complex calculations. In particular, this paper 
will quantify the following technical aspects of the arms 
race: 
I. Electromagnetic pulse (EMP). The range (km), E field 
strength (V1m), frequency spectrum (Hz), and radiative 
mechanism. 
II. Spy satellites. The size ofobjects and limits to resolu­
tion. 
III. ICBM accuracy. Uncertainties in parameters and 
the hardness of missile sites. 
IV. NAVSTAR global positioning satellites. Guidance 
by delay times and by Doppler shifts. 
V. Particle and laser beam weapons. Energy deposition, 
beam current, angular resolution, burning a hole in the 
atmosphere, and diffraction broadening. 
VI. Neutron bomb. The enhanced neutron yield and re­
duced blast area. 
VII. War games. The lethality parameterK, Minuteman 
vulnerability, and the Richardson model. 
I. ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE (EMP) 
Thecommand, control, the communication (e 3) systems 
which control the U.S. strategic forces can be vulnerable to 
the large electromagnetic pulses5 (E~25 000 V1m) that are 
created by high-altitude (100--500 km) or low-altitude (0-2 
km) bursts ofnuclear weapons. This vulnerability has been 
perceived by both the doves and hawks on arms control 
matters as creating a possible instability in the arms race. If 
a country perceives that the use of its strategic forces could 
be negated by the EMP so that it could not command and 
control its missiles, then this country might be tempted to 
adopt a "launch on warning" policy so that it would use its 
weapons rather than lose them to a preemptive first strike. 
The situation is not as unstable as I have characterized it 
because both nations have hardened their systems to par­
tially withstand the EMP and both nations have viable, 
second-strike missiles based on submarines that are not 
vulnerable to a first strike. However, the perception ofvul­
nerability in the land-based leg of the strategic triad (land­
sea-air) can create pressures for a "now or never," launch­
on-warning response. Since some of the C 3 facilities, such 
as the Air Force's Looking Glass command post in the sky, 
are more vulnerable than some of the strategic forces that 
they are intended to direct, and since the U.S. land-based 
missiles could be vulnerable to an EMP attack, it is clear 
that the EMP can affect military policy. 
A brief discussion of the mechanism that creates the 
EMP is given below: In an explosion of a nuclear weapon, 
many of the fission fragments are created in an excited 
state. Since these excited states have energies of 1 MeV or 
more, their lifetimes are much less than the risetime of the 
explosion (about 10 ns); the de-excitation gamma rays are 
emitted promptly. These prompt gamma rays interact with 
air molecules and create forward scattered Compton elec­
trons which constitute an energetic (about 1 MeV), nega­
tive current flowing radially outward from the weapon (see 
Fig. 1). In order to have a large EMP, it is necessary to 
remove the spherical symmetry around the nuclear weap­
on. At low altitudes above the Earth, a net dipole moment 
is created because the Compton electrons are in the form of 
a hemisphere rising above the Earth; the asymmetry of the 
rising, charged hemisphere creates the EMP. At high alti­
H>40km 
A~ ~ H=O-2km 
H 
Fig. I. Electromagnetic pulse (EMP). During a nuclear explosion gamma 
rays are emitted promptly from the excited states of the fission fragments; 
these prompt gamma rays transfer their energy to electrons in air mole­
cules by the Compton scattering process. The EMP is generated by these 
relativistic electrons by several mechanisms which depend on the altitude 
H of the nuclear explosion above the Earth. A surface blast at low alti­
tudes (H = 0-2 km) causes a hemispherical, rising Compton current 
which creates a large net vertical dipole current. An air burst (H = 2-20 
km) creates a small net vertical dipole moment because the asymmetrical 
density of air which varies exponentially with height. A high-altitude 
(H> 40 km) explosion creates Compton electrons that revolve in circles 
around the Earth's magnetic field lines; the centripetal acceleration of the 
Compton electrons produces EMP radiation. Because the Compton elec­
trons are relativistic, the EMP radiation from the individual electrons 
have a partial degree of coherence which can give very large E fields of 
greater than 25 000 V1m. The high-altitude EMP pulse can illuminate 
wide areas of the Earth's suface; the range ofthe EMP is determined by its 
line-of-sight distance, D = (2RH)1/2, where R is the radius of the Earth. 
tudes, the symmetry is broken because the air density var­
ies exponentially with height above the Earth so that the 
Compton electrons are created asymmetrically and a net 
dipole moment is created. The electrons created from the 
very high altitude bursts (above the atmosphere) follow a 
helical path about the Earth's magnetic field lines in the 
very thin upper atmosphere; the centripetal acceleration of 
these Compton electrons creates the EMP. In addition, the 
x rays following a nuclear explosion can also produce EMP 
effects by ionizing the atmosphere and momentarily affect­
ing the magnetic field configuration of the Earth. 
A. Range of EMP 
Assume that sufficient megatonnage is available for the 
EMP pulse, and that one must only consider line-of-sight 
geometry when considering covering the US with the EMP 
pulse. What is the height H of the blast that is necessary to 
cover 50% and 100% of the U.S.? 
Answer: The extremum distance from the nuclear deton­
ation to the ground is obtained from a right triangle which 
has one side as the distance D, the other side the radius R of 
the Earth at the location in question, and the hypotenuse 
extends from the center of the Earth to the blast (H +R ) 
(see Fig. 1). It follows that 
R 2+ D 2= (H + R )2~R 2+ 2HR, 
when H<.R. From this we obtain the height of the EMP 
blast to cover all the U.S.: 
H = D 2/2R = (2500 km2)212(64oo km) = 500 km. 
Forthecaseof50% ofthe U.S., D = 1800kmandH = 250 
km. 
B. Strength of the EMP fields 
What is the approximate average (rms) E field generated 
by the EMP pulse at a location D = 1000 km from the 
blast? Assume thefollowing: (1) 1-Mt weapon contains 1015 
calor 4.2 X 1015 J; (2) the prompt gamma rays constitute 
0.3% of the total energy, they have an average energy of 
about 1 MeV, and they are emitted over the lO-ns risetime 
of the blast; and (3) about 0.6% of the gamma ray energy is 
converted into Compton electrons. (If each of the fission 
fragments emitted a I-MeV gamma ray, and if 50% of 
these gamma rays were not absorbed by the materials ofthe 
weapon, then about 0.5% (1 MeV/2ooMeV) of the energy 
of the weapon would be in the form of prompt gamma 
rays.) 
Answer: The amount of energy available for the EMP 
pulse from the I-Mt weapons is about 
UEMP = (4.2X 1015 J)(0.003)(0.006) = 7.6X 1010 J. 
This energy can be considered to be approximately evenly 
distributed in a spherical shell with a volume 4rrD 2Twhere 
D is the distance from the site to the blast. The thickness T 
of the EMP shell is the product of the speed oflight and the 
time duration of the blast, or T = (3 X lOs m/s)(lO- s s) = 3 
m. Since 50% of the stored energy resides in the electric 
fields, we obtain 
UEMP/2 = (EoE 2/2)(4rrD 2 T) 
or 
E = (UEMP /4rrEoT)I/2/D 
= (7.6X 1O IO X9X 109/3)1/2/106 = 15000 V/m. 
A more sophisticated calculation of the E field is carried 
out in Sec. I C below, but this approximate estimate is suffi­
cient to show that the E field can be quite large. The ener­
gyI cm2deposited on the semiconducting components used 
in C 3 is of the order of 
(7.6X WID J)/(41T)(108 cm)2 = 6x 10-7 J/cm2. 
This flux ofenergy can be effectively multiplied by the area 
ofpowerlines, antennas, or missile bodies, and the resulting 
electrical transients can be sufficient to destroy many of the 
semiconducting devices. 
C. Frequency spectrum 
A fundamental calculation of the frequency and field 
strength distributions from a high-altitude burst involves a 
calculation of the magnitude of the Compton electronic 
charge and how this charge accelerates in the Earth's mag­
netic field. In order to do this we must consider the relativ­
istic expression for the radiative power, 
P = e2a2y4161TEr;e3, 
from an accelerated charge where a is the acceleration and 
y = 1/(1 - v21c2)1/2. 
Using this relationship, what is the approximate magni­
tude of the E field from a high-altitude, I-Mt explosion, 
and what is the maximum frequency ofthe EMP spectrum? 
The magnitude of the B field above the U.S. is about 0.6 G. 
Answer: Because the duration of the explosion is about 
10-8 s, the maximum frequency possible for the EMP is 
about 100 MHz, but in practice it is considerably lower. 
Since the Compton electrons have a kinetic energy ofabout 
I MeV = 2mr;e2; y = 3 and vic = 0.94. The radius ofgyra­
tion r of the Compton electrons in the Earth's field of0.6 G 
is 
r = ymov = 3(9.1 X 10-31 kg)0.94(3 X 108 m/s) 
eB (1.6X 10- 19 C)(O.6X 10-4T) 
=80m. 
The frequency of radiation associated with this motion is 
OJ = vir = 0.94(3 X 108 m/s)/80 m = 3.5 Mrad/s, 
or 
1= OJ/21T = 0.56 MHz. 
The approximate number of prompt gamma rays emit­
ted from the I-Mt explosion is 
N = (4.2X 1015 J)0.003 ( I MeV )1 /i( I MeV) 
r 1.6XIO-13JYI r 
= 7.9X 1015 r IMt. 
Since about 0.6% of this energy is converted to Compton 
electrons, the approximate initial number of Compton 
electrons produced is N e = 0.006(7.9 X 1025) = 4.7X 1023 
electronsl Mt, or 75 000 C/Mt. 
The initial centripetal acceleration for each Compton 
electron is about 
a = rOJ2 = 80 m(3.5 X 106/s)2 = 1.0X 1015 m/s2. 
The initial power radiated by this electron is 
P = e2a2y4161TEoC3 
= (1.6X 1O- 19 C)2(l.OX 1015 m/s2)(3)4(6X 109 )1(3 X 108 )3 
= 4.6X 10-22 W. 
If the fields from the N e = 4.7 X 1023 Compton electrons 
added incoherently, the EMP radiated power would be 
only about 
(4.7X 1023)(4.6X 10-22 W) = 220 W, 
which would not produce a very large E field. However, 
since the wavelength of this radiation, A = ell= 540 m, is 
much longer than the spatial thickness of the prompt radi­
ation, 
T = e( 10 ns) = 3 m, 
and since the velocity of the Compton electrons is approxi­
mately e, the EMP electric fields are partially additive, or 
coherent. Let us initially assume that all N e electrons give 
coherent EMP radiation; a comparison of the field from 
this completely coherent situation can then be compared to 
the given value of about 25 000 V1m to determine the de­
gree of coherence. 
If the Compton electrons radiated coherently, the effec­
tive radiative power would be (N;)P = 1.0X 1026 (similar 
to the radiative power of the sun!). The average value of the 
Poynting vector for this radiation [neglecting the sin2(O) 
distribution] is P 141TD 2where D is the distance from the 
closest Compton electrons to the site (perhaps an average 
effective value of 100 km). From this the average E field is 
given by 
E~(P141TEoCD2)1/2 
= [(1.0X 1026 W)(9X 109)/(3 X 108 m/s)(1010 m2)p/2 
= 5.5X 108 Vim. 
Since this result is about 104 times larger than the reported 
value of2.5 X 104V1m, we see that, on average, only about 
0.01 % of the Compton electrons must be totally coherent. 
As the Compton electrons loses energy, lower-frequency, 
longer-wavelength components are added to the EMP dis­
tribution, and the radiation becomes less coherent. 
Rather large currents can be generated by the EMP. The 
voltage developed along the length of a 20-m missile could 
be as much as V = (25 000 V1m) (20m) = 500 000 V. Since 
the inductive impedance of a missile at I MHz is about 
Z = 10 il, the current flowing along the surface of the mis­
sile could be as high as as 
I = VIZ = (5X lOS V)/(lOil) = 50 000 A. 
By coupling through various inductive and capacitive 
transfer impedances, this current can produce voltage tran­
sients on the center conductors of the cables in the missile 
on the order of 1-100 V. While this amount ofvoltage will 
only burn out the most sensitive semiconductors, it could 
upset the digital circuitry and nullify its computer logic. 
Much larger voltages could be developed on these logic 
elements if one considers the voltages developed on the 
powerlines to the missile sites, but is is possible to overcome 
these difficulties by shielding and hardening the electronics 
with filter circuits and fiber optics. 
II. SPY SATELLITES 
The high resolution6 obtainable with today's reconnais­
sance satellites has both a stabilizing and a destabilizing 
effect on the arms race. Since both sides are now capable of 
counting and monitoring the intercontinental ballistic mis­
siles (ICBM) of the other side, both sides should be less 
prone to be driven by "worst case analysis" to build addi­
tional systems to counter feared "missile gaps." Because of 
the satellites and other national technical means, many felt 
that the SALT treaties could be verified "adequately" to 
ensure compliance by the U.S.S.R. On the other hand, one 
could argue that accurate reconnaissance from spy satel­
lites would allow a nation to consider a preemptive first 
strike ifthe data showed that they might succeed in such an 
act. On balance, the spy satellites may well be more stabiliz­
ing then destabilizing to world peace; President Johnson 
commented on this aspect in 1967 when he indicated that 
the $35-$40 billion spent on space was worth it because "I 
know how many missiles the enemy has." In this section we 
will consider only the satellites using optical instruments, 
but it should be pointed out that these satellites can also 
monitor microwave, radiofrequency, active laser, and in­
frared signals in order to obtain a unique composite pic­
ture. 
A. Size of objects 
What is the smallest object that one might obtain with a 
spy satellite under the following assumptions: (1) lens sys­
tems with a focal lengths of 3-6 m; (2) satellite altitude of 
150 km (100 miles); and (3) film with grain sizes of about 1 
micron and a resolution ofabout 3 microns (1,u = 10-6 mI. 
(Ignore the limits to resolution by diffraction and by atmo­
spheric seeing until Sec. II B. 
Answer: Since the object distance is much greater than 
the focal length (0 = 150 km> f = 3-6 m), the image dis­
tance is approximately equal to the focal length: f = i. By 
similar triangles we can relate the size ofthe smallest object 
on the Earth, ho, to the image size on the film hi' by similar 
triangles: holo = hili. Inserting the numerical assump­
tions, the smallest object size on the earth is (ignoring the 
broadening effects of Sec. II B) 
ho = (o)(h i )If= (1.5 X las m)(3 ,u)/(3 m) = 15 cm (6 in.) 
for the case of the 3-m lens and 7.5 cm (3 in.) for the case of 
the 6-m lens. 
B. Diffraction-limited resolution 
What is the minimum diameter lens size necessary to 
ensure that the "single slit" diffractive effects are about the 
same as the film resolution caused by grain sizes ofabout 1 
micron? Because offluctuations in the atmosphere, astron­
omers have found that it is very difficult to observe resolu­
tions with optical telescopes much better than about one 
second ofarc. How does the angular resolution limitations 
from diffraction compare to the resolution limitations 
caused by atmospheric fluctuations? 
Answer: The angular limitations caused by diffraction 
can be approximated from the case of single slit diffraction 
where the angle () of the first minima is obtained from the 
formula (d 12) (sin ()) = A 12 where d is the diameter of the 
slit and A is the wavelength of light. For the case of small 
angles, we can equate the angle from diffraction to the an­
gular size of the image; () = A Id = hill The image size 
obtained from this approach, hi = fA. I d, is very close to the 
more accurately obtained diffraction limit obtained for cir­
cular lenses, hi = fA 10.82d. From this we obtain the ap­
proximate minimum size of the satellite lens in order to 
have equal broadening from diffraction and from grain 
size, 
d = AflO. 82 hi) = (0.5 ,u)(3 m)/(0.82X3,u) = 0.6 m. 
The angular sizes of the diffraction limitation and the 
image size are 
() = A /(O.8d) = (5 X 10-7m)/(0.8 XO.6 m) 
= 1.0X 10-6 rad 
= 0.2 arcsec. 
Since this value is less than 1 arcsec from atmospheric see­
ing, we might conclude that these resolutions are unattain­
able. However, since the photos are taken considerably 
above (100 km) the atmosphere, the effects of atmospheric 
seeing should be reduced compared to the case of astron­
omy since the fluctuating air cells are considerably closer (1 
km) to the telescope. If the size of the lens is large, the 
exposure time can be reduced and the effects of atmospher­
ic seeing will be reduced. In addition, the resolution ofpho­
tography from spy satellites can be improved by using the 
following technical improvements: (1) folded optical sys­
tems with longer focal lengths; (2) film containing photo­
sensitive molecular dyes with considerably reduced grain 
sizes; (3) lenses with larger diameters; (4) elliptical satellite 
orbits with reduced perigees of perhaps 50 km (for a short 
time) (5) computational techniques which deconvolute im­
ages smeared by diffraction; and (6) computational analysis 
of multiple exposures of the same object. 
III. ICBM ACCURACY 
If the accuracy of a missile is incree.sed, it follows that 
the yield necessary to carry out a mission against a hard­
ened military target can be correspondingly reduced. As 
accuracy increased by a factor of 20 from about 5 miles in 
1954 to 1/4 mile in 1970, the U.S. decreased the yield of its 
warheads by a factor of about 100 from 9 Mt (Titan) to 50­
100 kt (PolarislPoseidon) and 170-335 kt (Minuteman). 
Thus increased accuracy was the necessary precursor to 
the deployment ofsmaller warheads and MIRV. Accuracy 
can be further improved by using NAVSTAR satellites 
(Sec. IV), using the locations of stars, and other methods. 
The newer technologies available to the cruise missile have 
further increased accuracy to less than 10m for the cruise 
missile. The tradeoff between accuracy and yield can be 
qualitatively understood by considering the perfect gas 
law. Since we expect the heat deposited within a sphere of 
radius r to be proportional to the yield (Y) of the weapon, 
the temperature rise (.:1 T) should be approximately propor­
tional to the yield: Yex:: nC (.:1 T) where n is the number of 
moles of air within the sphere and C is the specific heat of 
air. Ifwe are considering locations reasonably close to the 
weapon, the temperature rise of the air will be approxi­
mately the same as the absolute temperature: .:1T-:::=.T. In­
serting these relationships into the perfect gas law, we ob­
tain 
PVex::Pr 3 ex::nRTex:: Y, 
which gives the proportionality Pex:: Y Ir 3. This approxi­
mate relationship agrees with the more accurate derivation 
by Brode,7 who considered the conservation of energy, 
mass, and momentum to obtain this result. (The r depen­
dence of the overpressure is 1/r 3 rather than 1/r since the 
width of a strongly compressed region increases propor­
tionally to the distance r.) It also agrees with the high-pres­
sure limit (the first term) in the empirical relationship7de­
rived from nuclear testing at the Earth's surface, 
.:1P = 14.7YIr 3 + 12.8(YIr 3)1/2, 
where.:1P is the overpressure in psi, Y is the yield in mega­
tons, and r is the distance from the detonation in nautical 
miles. Since accuracy improved by a factor of20 from 1954 
to 1970, it follows that the yield could have been reduced by 
a factor of (20f = 8000 in order to carry out the same mili­
tary mission. Since the yield was reduced by only a factor of 
100, the additional effective yield of Minuteman and Po­
laris must have been dedicated to overcoming hardened 
missile sites and to increasing the probability ofa successful 
mission. The miniturization of nuclear weapons has also 
enhanced the ability to destroy surface area ~as well as point 
targets). Since the destruction area A a: y 2 3, the area will 
be increased if the yield is divided (MIRV) among n sepa­
rate warheads, Y, = nYn • Since the ratio of the areas of 
destruction is 
AnIA, = ny~/31Yi/3 = n(Y,/n)2/3IYi/3 = n'/3, 
the area of destruction will be increased, for the case of 
n = 10, by a factor of 101/3 = 2.15. 
A. Guidance above the flat Earth 
In order to avoid the mathematical complications8 from 
an ICBM's Keplerian elliptical orbit, let us consider the 
trajectory ofan ICBM that follows a parabolic path above a 
large flat Earth. What is the accuracy of an ICBM which 
has the following properties: (1) an initial velocity of 
v = 104 m/s; (2) an uncertainty in the initial velocity of 
.<1v = 1O- 5v = 0.1 m/s in both the range and tracking di­
rections; (3) an initial vertical angle of0 = 30·~0.5 rad; (4) 
a vetical alignment error of.<10 = (4 X 10-5)(0) = 2X 10-5 
rad; and (5) an azimuthal alingment error of .<1¢J = 10-5 
rad. For simplicity, we will shall consider these uncertain­
ties to exist during the launch, rather than at the time when 
the re-entry vehicle (RV) is separated from the bus of the 
ICBM. 
Answer: The range of the "flat Earth" ICBM is 
X = v2 sin(20 )/g = (1~)2(sin 60")19.8 = 8800 km. 
The arrival time for this missile is 
t = 2v sin(300)/g = (2)(1~)(0.5)/(9.8) = 103s~ 17 min, 
fairly close to the 25-40 min that it takes an ICBM to travel 
9000 km. By taking the differential ofX and dividing by X, 
we obtain 
.<1XIX = 2(.<1vlv) + 2[.<10 Itan(20)] - (.<1glg). 
The uncertainty in the range from the uncertainty in the 
velocity is (2)(10-5)(8800 km) = 176 m, and from the un­
certainty in the vertical alignment is (2)(2 X 10-5)(8800 
km)/tan(600) = 203 m. In addition, we must take into ac­
count the error in the tracking direction (the transverse 
direction) caused by the misalignment of the azimulthal 
angle, 
.<1 Y = (.<1¢J )(v)(t) = (l0-5)(1~ m/s)(103 s) = 100 m. 
Since the effects of these errors will add randomly, it is 
appropriate to determine their root-mean-square value in 
the range, or 0", = (1762 + 2032)'/2 = 269 m. Combining 
this with the error in tracking we obtain 0" = (2692 
+ 1(02 )'12 = 287 m = 0.16 nm. If the range term was re­
duced by a factor of 3, to 90 m, 0" would drop to 134 
m = 0.07 nautical miles. For comparison sake, the new 
MX missile is intended to have an accuracy ofabout 100m 
(0.05 nautical miles) and the cruise missile has been shown 
to have an accuracy of better than 5 m after traveling 300 
miles (with continuous guidance). The last term in the 
equation (.<1glg) is the bias error term; this is discussed in 
Sec. VII. 
B. Rotating flat Earth 
If the vertical velocity is too large by an amount 
.<1v = (1O- 5 )(v) = 0.1 mis, the missile will fall to the westz 
of the target since the Earth has rotated an additional dis­
tance eastward during the extra time offlight. How large is 
this effect at the equator? 
Answer: The error in the vertical velocity will increase 
the time of flight by .<1t= 2(.<1vz )/g= (2)(0.1)/(9.8) = 0.02 
s. Since the Earth moves 0.44 km/s at the equator, this 
effect will cause the missile to fall to the west by about 
.<1X = v.<1t = 0.44 km/s)(0.02 s) = 9 m. This value is about 
a factor of3 less than the published value of30 m/(O.1 m/s) 
for elliptical orbits. Since the error is somewhat less than 
the errors discussed above, we can ignore this contribution. 
c. MX basing mode 
One of the many issues raised in the discussion of the 
MX missile is the type of basing mode9 that might be used 
such as the "race track" shelters (vertical or horizontal), 
"dense pack," hardened Minuteman silos, or submarine 
based. Since it takes a relatively small overpressure of 
about 5 psi to destroy an ordinary brick house and it takes a 
significantly larger pressure of 2000 psi to destroy a hard­
ened, H, Minuteman silo, it is clear that the choice of bas­
ing mode is relevant to the survivability of the MX to a 
first-strike attack. Determine the approximate accuracy 
that would be necessary to destroy the MX shelter by an 
attacking missile under these conditions: (1) the incoming 
missile has a yield of 0.75 megatons; and (2) the MX is 
stored either in a horizontal "race track" shelter which is 
hardened to withstand about H = 600 psi, in a hardened 
Minuteman silo (H = 2000 psi), or a superhardened silo 
(H = 5000 psi or more). 
Answer: The accuracy needed (r) to develop 600 psi from 
a Y = 0.75 Mt bomb is obtained from 
H = 600 psi = (14.7)(0.75Ir 3) + (12.8)(0.75Ir 3)'/2, 
which gives r = 0.28 nautical miles = 510 m. For the case 
of H = 2000 psi we obtain r = 0.18 nautical miles = 335 
m; and for H = 5000 psi we obtain r = 0.13 nautical 
miles = 245 m. These results imply that there is a diminish­
ing return for the hardening ofmissile sites since hardening 
the silo from 2000 to 5000 psi only required improving the 
accuracy from 0.18 to 0.13 nautical miles. The ultimate 
hardening would be determined from the maximum radius 
of the crater from the 0.75 Mt warhead which is about 
r~ 160 y O.3 = 140m for the case of the silo in a rock medi­
um (170 m in dry soil). It is clear that the vulnerability of 
the MX system, or any system, is much more complicated 
(see Sec. VII) than this simple example as one must consid­
er launch reliablity; the effect of the EMP on the C 3 sys­
tems; the ability to determine the occupancy of an MX 
shelter by thermal, acoustic, or optical sensors; the use of 
decoys in shelters; fratricide effects (the destruction of an 
incoming missile by another incoming missile); degrada­
tion of theoretical performance standards; the inability to 
test such a theoretical option; and the survivability ofother 
systems such as bombers, submarines, tactical weapons, 
and cruise missiles. 
D. Dense Pack 
It has been proposed to base the MX missile in a very 
closely packed matrix so that incoming missiles would des­
troy each other (fratricide). Ifthe nearest-neighbor distance 
is 545 m (1800 ft), determine the minimum value of the 
hardness (H in psi) of the MX silos that would prevent the 
incoming warheads (Y = 0.75, 1,5, and 25 Mt) from des­
troying more than one MX silo. Consider the incoming 
warheads to be accurately placed so that they land on the 
surface, equidistance from two silos. (Accuracy of missiles 
will be considered in Sec. VII.) 
Answer: Since the nearest-neighbor spacing is 545 m, an 
incoming warhead that was located halfway between two 
silos would be 273 m from each silo. Using the formula for 
overpressure from surface blasts (Sec. III q, we obtain the 
following values: H> 3500 psi for 0.75 Mt warheads; 
H> 5000 psi (1 mT); and H> 22 000 psi (5 Mt); and 
H> 110 000 psi (25 Mt). In addition, one must consider the 
size of the craters from these warheads; if the radius of the 
craters.? is greater than 273 m, then both silos could be 
destroyed. By using the Rand Corporation's "Bomb Dam­
age Effect Computer" (1964), we have obtained the radii of 
the craters in rock: r = 142 m (0.75 Mt), r = 158 m (1 Mt), 
r = 279 m (5 Mt), and r = 485 (25 Mt). By using more resil­
ient rock media it is possible to reduce these radii some­
what, but it is clear that a very large warhead would create 
a large enough crater to envelope two MX silos. (There is 
some recent evidence that these crater radii should be re­
duced by a factor of about 2.) 
IV. NAVSTAR GLOBAL POSITIONING 
SATELLITES 
The United States is developing the NAVSTAR10 sys­
tem of orbiting satellites which would be used to enhance 
the accuracy of cruise missiles, antiship missiles, glide 
bombs, or heavy missiles. Twenty-four orbiting satellites 
would be located in nongeosynchronous orbits about 
11 000 miles above the Earth. The missiles would deter­
mine their positions by comparing the time delays and 
Doppler shifts of the signals from several satellites. Since a 
cruise missile using the NAVSTAR guidance system 
would not broadcast radar signals to determine its location, 
but would only receive and analyze signals from satellites 
to make midcourse guidance corrections, the NAVSTAR 
system would diminish the vulnerability of the cruise mis­
sile. The proponents of the system claim that NAVSTAR 
would be viable for both high- and low-altitude approaches 
and for "launch and leave" tactics that would allow the 
launching aircraft to withdraw as soon as the missile is 
fired; the opponents claim that the NAVSTAR signal 
could bejammed and that the NAVSTAR satellites are soft 
targets that could be destroyed easily. 
A. Guidance by delay times 
Using triangulation, estimate the approximate accuracy 
in position available to a cruise missile system that had the 
following characteristics: (1) NAVSTAR orbits are 17700 
km above the Earth's surface and 24150 km above the 
center of the Earth; (2) the 24 NAVSTAR satellites are in 
equally spaced equatorial orbits; (3) the cruise missile fol­
lows trajectories less than I km above the Earth's surface; 
and (4) the cruise missile can measure time differences of 
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Fig. 2. NAVSTAR global positioning satellites could increase the accura­
cy of missiles in two ways. By monitoring the time differences of radio 
signals from several NAVSTAR satellites, it would be possible to triangu­
late the position of the missile to, perhaps, less than 10 m in three dimen­
sions. By also monitoring the history of the Doppler shifts of the signals 
from several NAVSTAR's, it should be possible to determine the velocity 
ofthe missile to, perhaps,less than 1cm/s. As the missile moves ahead 1m 
in its orbit, the side C increases by 0.35 m; this movement creates a time 
delay of 2.4 ns between the signals from the NAVSTAR satellites closest 
to the zenith satellite. This movement of 1 m makes the angle E = 5.6 
X 10-8 rad; this angle would cause a Doppler shift ofaboutO.1 Hz from a 
lQO-GHz NAVSTAR signal. 
about I ns between the signals from different NAVSTAR 
satellitess. 
Answer: For simplicity, let us consider the cruise missile 
to be directly under one of the NAVSTAR satellites.The 
signals from the first neighbor satellites (360°/24 = 15°) on 
either side of the satellite in the zenith position) will arrive 
at the cruise missile at the same time. (See Fig. 2.) First of 
all, let us determine the distance C between the cruise mis­
sile and the first neighbor NAVSTAR. Since we will be 
using the differential form of the law of cosines, it will not 
be necessary to carry out trigonometric calculations to nine 
significant figures. Consider a triangle with side A as the 
chord between the zenith satellite and its first neighbor, 
side B as the distance between the zenith satellite and the 
cruise missile (17 700 km), and side C. The chord length 
A = 2R sin(7S) where R is 24150 km, the distance from 
center of the Earth to a NAVSTAR satellite; we obtain 
A = 6304 km. Since we know the length of sides A and B, 
and the outside angle between these sides (105°), the dis­
tance between the the first neighbor satellites and the cruise 
missile is 
C = [A 2 +B 2 + 2AB cos(1050W/2 = 17 184 km. 
If the cruise missile moves forward in its orbit I m with 
respect to its former position directly under the zenith 
NAVSTAR, there will be a delay time between the pulses 
from the two first-neighbor NAVSTAR's. Since the I-m 
shfit will increase the distance B by only one part in 1014, 
we will consider both B andA as constants. The change in C 
is thus mainly caused by the change in the angle between A 
and B which is tan(E)~E = 0.001 km/17700 km = 5.6 
X 10-8 rad = 3.2X 10-6 deg. The distances from the two 
nearest-neighbor satellites to the cruise missile can be de­
termined directly from the law of cosines by adding (and 
subtracting) the angle E from the 105·angle; or, more easily, 
by taking the differential of the law ofcosines, (A and Bare 
effectively constant) 
Cf - C; =.::iC = ABE sin(105")1C = 0.35 m. 
The time delay between the two nearest-neighbor NAV­
STAR pulses will be (2XO.35 m)/(3X 108 m/s) = 2.4 ns 
which is much larger than the inaccuracy from hydrogen 
maser atomic clocks (10- 13) and quartz clocks which are 
being considered for NAVSTAR. A more accurate treat­
ment of this problem would have to take into account the 
57oms transit time ofthe pulses and the relative velocities of 
the two satellites. If the computer in the cruise missile is 
able to take into account these factors, then, perhaps, the 
NAVSTAR system might be able to determine locations 
on their trajectories to within, perhaps, 10 m in three di­
mensions. 
B. Guidance by Doppler shifts 
Estimate the change in the Doppler shift of a l00-GHz 
signal from a NAVSTAR as an ICBM missile passes di­
rectly under the NAVSTAR in the zenith position to 1 m 
beyond the zenith position. 
Answer: The velocities of the NAVSTAR and the ICBM 
are determined from v = (GM Ir)l/2 where G = 6.673 
X 10- 11 N m2/kg2,Mis themass ofthe Earth (5.983X 1024 
kg), and the radius r is 24 150 km for NAVSTAR and 6450 
km for the ICBM. We obtain v = 4066 m/s for the NAV­
STAR and v = 7868 for the ICBM missile. Their relative 
velocity is 3802 m/s (when they move in the same direction) 
and 11 934 m/s (when they move in the opposite direction). 
Since we can ignore the relativistic transverse Doppler shift 
at these velocities, there will be no Doppler shift when the 
ICBM is exactly in the zenith position. When the ICBM 
moves forward by 1 m with respect to the zenith position, 
the l00-GHz signal will be shifted by 
.::if=f(vlc) sin(E) = (1011 )(380213 X 108)(5.6X 10-8) 
=0.071 Hz 
when they travel in some direction and.::if= 0.22 Hz when 
they travel in the opposite direction. In addition it can be 
readily shown that a 1-m movement in the position of the 
ICBM will also shift the signal from the neighboring NAV­
STAR satellites by about 0.1 Hz. Presumably, by measur­
ing the various beat frequencies available to the ICBM, it 
should be possible to determine positions on the trajectory 
from the history of the Doppler shift measurements to less 
than tens ofmeters. (Or the velocity to, perhaps, 1-10 cm/s 
using the position data from time delays in Sec. IV A.) 
V. PARTICLE AND LASER BEAM WEAPONS 
The superpowers are currently developing weapons that 
would utilize the kinetic energy (in the GeV range) ofparti­
de beams or the energy content of laser beams to destroy 
incoming missiles, surface cruise missiles, ships, or satel­
lites. The particle- and laser-beam weapons might be 
mounted on the surface ofthe Earth, in the space shuttle, or 
on satellite stations in space. These weapons have to be 
described as futuristic since there are many technological 
obstacles that must be overcome before they would become 
operational. In addition, these weapons would be vulnera­
ble to countermeasures by the attacking force. These weap­
on systems have been described II in some detail by Tsipis et 
aI., and we will discuss only their more general properties. 
A. Energy deposition 
What flux ofenergy (J/cm2) would be necessary to preig­
nite the chemical explosives around a nuclear weapon in 
the incoming missile? Following Tsipis et al. assume that a 
temperature rise of500 ·C can preignite the explosive mate­
rial which has a density ofp = 0.8 glcm3 and a molecular 
weight of about M = 50. In addition, assume that the ab­
sorption length for 1 GeV electrons is about 10 cm; the 
beam loses about 10% of its energy in 1 cm. How much 
would this flux of energy raise the temperature of the alu­
minum body of the missile? 
Answer: The energy density needed to predetonate the 
chemical explosive is Q= Cp.::i TIM where the .::i T is the 
temperature rise and the specific heat C = 3R = 25 J/mo­
le·C (since T> 0D' the Debye temperature). We obtain 
Q= (3R lo.::i TIM = (25)(0.8)(500)150 = 200 J/cm3• 
Since about 10% of the energy is deposited in 1 cm, the 
energy intensity of the beam must be about 2000 J/cm2 in 
order to deposit 200 J/cm3 in the chemical explosive. This 
same flux ofenergy would raise the temperature,.::i T, ofthe 
aluminum missile: 
Q= 200 J/cm3 = (3R lo.::iT1M = (25)(2.7)(.::iT)/27, 
which gives .::i T = 80·C. This modest temperature rise 
would begin to cause some internal stresses and misalign­
ment in the missile. Doses about eight times larger (16 000 
J/cm2 and 1500 J/cm3) would raise aluminum to its melt­
ing temperature of 660 ·C. In addition, the particles can 
cause havoc with the semiconducting components in the 
guidance systems; energy densities as low as 25 J/cm3 can 
cause shifts in the switching thresholds of the circuit ele­
ments and 1000 J/cm3 can destroy the elements. The ener­
getic particles could create centers for trapping, and re­
combination which would reduce the lifetime of the 
minority carriers. 
B. Beam current and angular resolution 
What minimum beam current of 1GEV electrons would 
be necessary to preignite the chemical explosive in the in­
coming missile? Assume that the size of the beam is dictat­
ed by the 1-m diameter of the missile booster and that the 
pulse duration is determined by the velocity of the missile, 
v = 104 m/s. What angular accuracy (.::iO) would be re­
quired to disable a missile which is 1000 km away and 
above the atmosphere? 
Answer: Using the energy intensity of 2000 Jlcm2 from 
Sec. V A, the energy delivered to an area of 1 m2 (dictated 
by the diameter of the missile) is (2000 J/cm2) (104 
cm
2 ) = 2x 107 J. In order to keep the area of the beam on 
the missile for a single shot without continuous tracking, 
the time duration of the pulse must be less than t = (1 ml 
104 m/s) = 0:' ms. The energy in the pulse is VIt = 2 X 107 
J where V = 109 V and I is the current in amperes. Solving 
for I, we get 
1= (2X 107)1Vt = (2X 107)1(109)(10- 4) = 200 A. 
If the beam was intended to melt aluminum or destroy se­
miconducting components, the current and energy of the 
beam must be at least five times higher, or 1000 A and 108 J. 
It has been estimated that the efficiency of prOducing a 
pulse of particles is about 1/6, thus it takes about 6 X 108 J 
to make the 1000-A pulse. Since it takes abot 0.91b ofcoal 
to generate a kW h = 3.6 X 106 J, it would take about 150 Ib 
of coal (or 1000 Ib ofTNT) to generate one pulse; the large 
amount ofany type of fuel would certainly complicate the 
logistics of placing either particle- or laser-beam weapons 
on a space station. For comparison sake there are already 
existing high-voltage, low-current accelerators, such as the 
Fermilab's proton accelerator which has a current of 0.1 
rnA at an energy of 500 GeV, and there are low-voltage, 
high-current electron accelerator used in the fusion pro­
gram which have a current of 106 A (per beam) at an energy 
of 2 MeV. Because the Earth's magnetic field will deflect 
long-range, charged particle beams, a beam of neutral hy­
drogen atoms (produced from H - beams passing through a 
stripper gas) might be considered. The present technology 
is not yet capable of these requirements as the Los Alamos 
Meson Factory is capable of developing currents of only 
0.15 A ofH- ions at 1 GeV. 
In order to "shoot a bullet 1000 km away with a bullet," 
the beam must be aligned to within an accuracy ofJi() = 1 
m/106 m = 10-6 rad. Since this kind ofaccuracy would be 
difficult to carry out, it is likely that the beam current 
would have to be correspondingly increased to compensate 
for a larger spread in beam size at the target. IfJi ()'.:::::!.10 - 5, 
the current and total energy of the beam would have to be 
increased by a factor of 100; if the target was considerably 
closer, this would not be necessary. 
C. Burning a hole in the atmosphere 
Since relativistic electrons and protons of about 1 GeV 
lose about 0.2 GeVIkm when they pass through air, they 
would not be able to penetrate through the entire atmo­
sphere. Particle beam weapons that were located on the 
surface ofthe Earth would have to be able to "burn a hole in 
the atmosphere" in order to reduce energy losses and make 
the weapon viable over longer distances. If the air density 
in the "hole" in the atmosphere was reduced by a factor of 
10, then the energy loss rate would be reduced to 0.02 
GeVIkm, and the beam would then lose about 0.2 GeV 
(20% of the beam energy) to pass through the entire atmo­
sphere of 10 km. Approximately how much energy would 
it take to reduce the density of the air by a factor of ten in a 
"hole" that had an area of 1 cm2and was 1 km long? The 
density of air is 1.3 kglm3 and its specific heat at constant 
pressure is 1000 JIkg ·C. 
Answer: Using the perfect gas law, PV = nRT, we see 
that the temperature must be raised from about 300 to 3000 
K in order to allow a reduction in the density, nlV, by a 
factor of 10. The mass of the heated air in the atmospheric 
hole is (1.3 kglm3)( 103 m)( 10-4 m2) = 0.13 kg. The amount 
of energy required to heat the "hole" is 
Q = mCJi T = (0.13)( 1000)(2700) = 3.5 X 105 J. 
Additional energy would be lost by the partial heating of 
the air forced out ofthe hole, by the loss of scattered radi­
ation and secondary particles, and by turbulance. Our val­
ue of0.4X 106 JIktn is a lower bound value and it is about 
25% of the more accurately calculatedII value of 1.5 X 10° 
Jlkm. This energy loss is about 1%/km of the beams ener­
gy of 108 J; a lO-km path would use 10% of the beam's 
energy; this is similar to the energy that would be lost by the 
beam as it passed through the hole. At this time it is unclear 
how long the high-energy beam would remain in the hole 
over these extended distances. 
D. Laser-beam weapons 
Either a 25-kJ pulse laser or a 1-MW continuous laser is 
capable ofdestroying nearby aircraft. However, since laser 
beams do not readily pass through fog or rain, the laser­
beam weapons could not be counted on to defend against a 
surprise attack on a rainy day. For this reason, the laser­
beam weapons (if they are ever deployed) would probably 
be used above the atmosphere. Determine the necessary 
energy for a laser pulse to destroy a missile 1000 km away 
using these assumptions: (1) it takes a pulse ofabout 1000 JI 
cm2(Sec. V A above) to create an impulsive failure in thin 
metal targets such as missiles; (2) the CO2laser has a wave­
length A = 10.6 Jlm; and (3) the beam extraction mirror of 
the laser has a diameter d = 3 m. 
Answer: The finite diameter of the extraction mirror 
causes a diffraction broadening in the laser beam 
Ji() = 1.2U Id = (1.22)(1O.6X 10-6 m/3 m) 
= 4.3 X 10-6 rad. 
This effect will broaden the radius of the laser beam 1000 
km away to 
r = (Ji() )(1000 km) = 4.3 m. 
Since it takes about 1000 J/cm2 ofabsorbed energy to par­
tially melt and crack the missile body, the energy in the 
laser pulse must be (1000 J/cm2 )(1T)(430 cm)2 = 5.8 X 108 J 
for the case of total absorption, and ten times this for the 
case of 10% absorption of the laser beam. This energy re­
quirement is considerably larger than the presently con­
templated 25-kJ pulsed lasers being developed for the fu­
sion program. If the weapon was a 1-MWcontinuous laser, 
then the laser would have to be focused on the target for 
t = (5.8 X 108 J)/(106 J/s) = 580 s~ 10 min, 
which is one of the reasons that very large HF lasers are 
now being explored. 
VI. THE NEUTRON BOMB 
Because the yield of a neutron bombl2 is approximately 
equally divided between the fission and fusion processes, it 
produces many more neutrons (that are also much more 
energetic than the neutrons from a pure fission tactical 
weapon). It is for this reason that the neutron bomb is also 
referred to as the enhanced-radiation weapon (ERW). The 
deployment ofthe neutron bomb in Europe has been a con­
troversial issue for several reasons: On the one hand, it has 
been encouraged because some feel that we will not use our 
present tactical weapons to stop an invasion ofconvention­
ally armed tanks because the yield of our present tactical 
weapons is too large (some are greater than 20 kt, but some 
also that can be reduced with a dial to about 1 kt). These 
leaders want the neutron bomb because a 1-kt version 
would be able to incapacitate tank crews at a distance of 
about 850 m compared to 375 m for a pure fission weapon 
of the same yield. They argue that it would destroy about 
five times as many tanks for about the same amount ofblast 
damage to the countryside ofan ally. The proponents ofthe 
neutron bomb feel that the mere possession of it would 
increase the perception of the potential invader. that. we 
would actually use it, and thus it would deter an invasIO~. 
On the other hand, it can be envisioned that the use of!hls 
type of a tactical weapon would lowe~ !he psychological 
and bureaucratic threshold for the deciSion makers to use 
nuclear weapons, and thus its deployment would increase 
the probability that there would be a precursor to a more 
general nuclear war that nobody wants. The opponents of 
the neutron bomb do not believe that the neutron bomb 
would actually incapacitate that many tank crews because 
the invading forces would space the tanks further apart in 
order to negate the effects of the neutron bomb. 
A. Number of neutrons 
Determine the approximate numbers of neutrons at a 
distance of 800 m from weapons that derive their energy 
from (1) pure fission, (2) pure fusion, and (3) 50% each of 
fission and fusion. Assume the following: (1) the weapons 
have a yield of I kt = 1012 cal = 4.2 X 1012 J; (2) initially, 
ignore the scattering of the fast neutrons by the atmo­
sphere; (3) the energy of fission is about 200 MeV and the 
energy from fusion (H2+ H3-+He4 + nj is 17.6 MeV; and 
(4) the chain reaction from a fission weapon yields about 
one surplus neutron. 
Answer: The yield ofa l-kt weapon is (4.2X 1012 J) (leV/ 
1.6X 10- 19 J) = 2.6X lQ31 eV. If one assumes that one of 
the three neutrons from a fission event is used to sustain the 
chain reaction and one is absorbed in the weapon, then one 
neutron/fission will escape from the weapon. The number 
ofneutrons that escape from a l-kt fission weapon is about 
n = (2.6X 1031 eV)(1 neutron/2X 108 eV) 
= 1.3 X lQ23 neutrons. 
the number of neutrons from a l-kt pure fusion weapon 
would be about 
n = (2.6X 1031 eV)(1 neutron/17.6X 106 eV) 
= 1.5 X IQ24 neutrons, 
which is about a factor of 10 greater than the result for the 
fission weapon. Since a fusion weapon needs the heat from 
the fission precursor, it is necessary to have a mixed fis­
sion/fusion weapon to make a neutron bomb. For the case 
of50%/50%, we obtain 8.2X 1023 neutrons which is about 
six times the number ofneutrons from a comparable fission 
weapon. [The number of neutrons per kiloton can also be 
increased by removing the "tamper" (orjacket) material on 
the outside ofthe weapon.] 
Neglecting the scattering of the fast neutrons by the at­
mosphere, we obtain the integrated neutron flux at 800 m 
as follows: 
n/area = 1.3 X lQ23/(41r)(8 X lQ4 cm)2 
= 1.6X 1012 neutrons/cm2 
for the case of the fission weapon and 1013 neutrons/cm2 
for the neutron bomb. Becauseofscattering and absorption 
by the atmosphere and other uncertainties, these values for 
the neutron fluxes are about two to three times greater than 
the experimental13 values. (The fluxes actually drop more 
quickly, closer to r-4 than r- 2• Brode7 indicates that the 
exponential function e - rip can be used.) 
B. Radiation dosages 
If a person receives a dose of about. 8000 r~d~ (1 
rad = 100 erg/g), he or she will be incapacitated Within a 
period ofabout 5 min and will die within a day or two. If a 
l-kt fission bomb will deliver about 250 rads of neutrons at 
a distance of 800 m, what approximate dosage level ~ould 
the neutron bomb deliver at the same distance? What IS the 
approximate ratio of radioactive fallout from the neutron 
bomb and the fission bomb? 
Answer: The radiation dosage from the neutron bomb 
would be considerably greater than a fission bomb of the 
same yield because it produces about ~ix times more nel;l­
trons and each neutron is bout seven Umes more energetic 
(14 MeV/2 MeV = 7). Thus one would expect the neutron 
bomb to deliver an instantaneous dosage ofabout (250 rads) 
(6) (7)~ 10 000 rads, which is enough to incapacitate a per­
son within about 5 min. Since the fission process produces 
much more radioactivity than the fusion process, the neu­
tron bomb (which is 50% fission) will produce about 50% 
as much radioactive fallout as the pure fission bomb. 
c. Reduced blast 
About 50% of the yield of a fission weapon appears in 
the form of blast energy which can destroy buildings. For 
the case of a fusion bomb, the blast contribution is only 
20%. How much less area would be destroyed by a blast 
from a neutron weapon than from a fission weapon? 
Answer: The blast energy (BE) for the fission weapon is 
0.5 kt and for the neutron bomb it is about (0.5 + 0.2)/ 
2 = 0.35 kt. Since the destruction area is approximately 
proportional to (BE)2/3 (see Sec. III), the ratio of destruc­
tion area from the neutron bomb to that ofthe fission bomb 
is An/Af = (0.35/0.5)2/3 = 0.79. This result indicates that 
the destruction area from the use of the neutron bomb 
would be about 21 % less than the destruction area of a 
fission bomb of the same yield. Combining this result with 
the increased area for neutron dosages, one obtains a neu­
tron radiation area from the neutron bomb which is about 
(800 m/375 m)2/(0.79) or six times greater for the same 
blast area from the fission bomb. 
VII. WAR GAMES 
In this section we shall briefly discuss some simplified 
models for "war games" that have been discussed in the 
literature. These models have allowed the participants in 
the debates on the arms race to compare widely diverse 
missile systems in order to prove their debating points. Per­
haps ultimately, one can not use equations and parameters 
to describe the "action-reaction" escalation of the arms 
race, and the degree ofstability from mutually assured de­
struction (MAD), but it is also true that these mathematical 
models do give some meaningful insights into the interac­
tions that affect the outcomes of these difficult questions. 
The results of the this section should be properly modified 
to account for the many uncertainties in the arms race: (1) 
the debris (EMP, wind, ionized atmosphere, dust particles) 
from an incoming missile can negate a second incoming 
missile (the fratricide effect), or prevent the launching of 
the missile in the silo from being launched (the pin-down 
effect); (2) the uncertainty in the parameters of the missile 
systems will complicate any numerical analysis; this is par­
ticularly true for the reliability of these complex systems; 
(3) since the Partial Test Ban treaty (PTB) prevents any 
rehearsal of a preemptive first strike, no attacker can be 
sure that the intricate timing and coordination of events 
will actually be successful; (4) the uncertain locations of 
submarines missile systems, bombers, cruise missiles mo­
bile missiles, and tactical weapons will further compiicate 
a~y dis~ussion of a "first strike in a war game"; and (5) 
either side may have strategies and hardware that are un­
known to the other side. 
A. Lethality parameter 
During the testimony on the SALT II treaty before the 
U.S. Senate, the lethality parameter K was used to discuss 
the various U.S. and U.S.S.R. missile systems. It was de­
fin~d as K = Y 2/3ICEp2, where Y is the yield of the weap­
on m megatons and CEP is the accuracy (the circular error 
probable) of the weapon in nautical miles. The CEP is de­
fined as the radius of the circle centered in the pattern 
which contains 50% of the missiles which were launched. 
The center of this pattern can be shifted from the aim point 
by bias errors (which may, or may not, be included in the 
definition of CEP). Why would the testimony on SALT II 
use the K parameter? In our calculations we will assume 
that the testimony was ony dealing with the silo-busting, 
high-pressure regime ofsmall distances from the silo where 
one considers only the first term in the pressure relation­
ship (Sec. III). Let us speculate on the general form (follow­
ing Tsipis's derivation14) of the single-shot-kill-probability 
(SSKP) formula if one considers that the accuracy of the 
individual missiles are randomly spread about the aim 
point with a normal Gaussian distribution such that the 
probability of survival is 
P = e - r;/2"> 
s 
where the survival radius rs is the minimum distance from 
the silo that a weapon of yield Y can explode without de­
stroying the silo. The standard deviation ofthe distribution 
is q and assume that it is proportional to CEP; Tsipis has 
shown that q = 0.85 CEP. Assume that the silo is hardened 
to withstand a pressure of H psi before it is destroyed. 
Answer: The minimum pressure to destroy a missile silo 
is H = J.P a:. Y 1r 3. The area in which the silo could be de­
stroyedisproportionaltor 1a:. (Y IH)2/3. Thearea that con­
tains 50% of the missile landings is proportional to CEp2. 
The ratio of the area ofdestruction to the area of accuracy 
is proportional to y 2 / 3/CEp2 which is defined as the letha­
lity K. This definition contains only the parameters of the 
incoming missile without mentioning the degree ofharden­
ing of the silo. By multiplying K by the MIRV number n 
and the number of missiles of that category, m, one can 
obtain the lethality ofa class ofmissiles, nmK. By summing 
over all the classes of missiles, one obtains the grand total 
lethality ofa nation's arsenal. This procedure has been used 
in the testimony before the Congress and elsewhere. 14 The 
discussion on lethality can be misleading in that a warhead 
can have a very large lethality, but it still can destroy at 
most only one silo. 
It follows that the single-shot kill probability for a mis­
sile is of the form 
- 1 P - 1 - r;/2"> - 1 - y213/BH2I J CEp2Pk- - s- -e - -e , 
where Tsipis has shown that B = 0.22 when Y is in mega­
tons, H is in psi, and CEP is in nautical miles. Using the 
definition of lethality, this formula becomes 
P = 1 _ e-K/O.22H2IJ.
k 
B. Minuteman vulnerability 
The uncertainties that we described in the introduction 
to this section indicate that a simple calculation of the vul­
nerability of the Minuteman force is more complicated 
than the formulas that we have developed in Sec. VII A. In 
addition, the retaliatory aspects of the submarines, 
bombers, and tactical weapons can act as a deterrent if one 
were ~o wish to take advantage of whatever vulnerability 
the Mmuteman force has. Determine the SSKP ofdestroy­
ing a Minuteman silo assuming the following param­
eters9•14: (1) Minuteman silos are hardened to about 
H = 2000 psi; (2) the Russian SS-18 warheads have a yield 
Y = 0.75 megatons and a CEP = 0.15 nautical miles (at 
some point in the future); and (3) the reliability R ofan SS­
18 is, perhaps, 0.8, or 0.9. What is the kill probability for a 
silo if two SS-18 weapons from different launchers are 
aimed at the Minuteman silo? 
Answer: The lethality of the SS-18 warhead is 
K = (0.75)2/3/0.15 2= 36.7. The SSKP for the SS-18 on a 
Minuteman silo is 
P = 1 - e - 36.7/10.22)(2000)2/3 = 1 - 0.35 = 0.65.k 
The SSKP should be multiplied by the reliability of the SS­
18 to obtain the success rate for each SS-18 warhead' we 
obtain 52% for 80% reliability, and 59% for 90% reli~bil­
ity. For the case of two SS-18 weapons from different 
launchers (arriving less than about 10 s apart to avoid fra­
tricide effects), the kill probability is Pk 2 = 1-(0.48)2 
= 77% for 80% reliability and 83% for 90% reliability. 
Because offratricide effects, it is likely that at most two SS­
18's would be targeted at one Minuteman silo, one in the air 
and one on the ground. Nevertheless, for the case of three 
independent SS-18's, Pk3 = 1 - (0.48f = 89% (for the 
case of 80% reliability). Since there are 1000 Minuteman 
missiles, these results imply that perhaps 170 to 230 would 
survive two SS-18's, and 100 would survive three SS-18's. 
The latter case would consume the entire SS-18 force since 
there are about 308 SS-18 launchers and each is MIRVed 
ten times. Since neither side has projected missiles over the 
North Pole, this discussion may not consider the additional 
bias errorl5 (J.gIg term, Sec. III A) from the intended tar­
get caused by uncertainties in the Earth's gravitational 
field. Since the polar radius of the Earth is 21 km (0.3%) 
smaller than its equatorial radius, the quadrupolar correc­
tion to g should be of the order of (J.gIg) ~ 10-3, or 100 
times larger than the ratio of(CEPIrange) = (10- 1 km/104 
km) = 10-5• It follows that the corrections for the multipo­
larity and the local gravity at the launch site must be car­
ried out to within about 1% accuracy in order to prevent 
degradation of the CEP accuracy of the missile. 
As we have shown, the probability of destroying a mis­
sile site depends on many parameters (Y, CEP, H, R, and 
gravitational bias error). It is possible to determine the rela­
tive importance of changes in these parameters by taking 
the differential of the total single-shot kill probability TK 
which takes into account the reliability R of the missile 
system: 
TK=RPk =R(1-e- U ), 
where a = K I(O.22H 2/3) = Y 2/3/0.22CEp2H 2/3. It fol­
lows that 
J.TK ITK = J.R /R + (2a/3)(J.Y IY -J.HIH 
- 3J. CEPICEP)/(ea - 1). 
For the case of an SS-18 attacking Minuteman, we have 
used Y = 0.75 Mt, H = 2000 psi, CEP = 0.15 (in 1985?), 
R = 0.8 to 0.9, K = 36.7, and a = 1.0506. If we allow the 
parameters (Y, H, CEP, and R) to vary by 10%, we find 
that a 10% increase in yield (.1 Y I Y = 0.1) will increase TK 
by 3.8% (.1 TKITK = 0.038). Similarity, TK can be in­
creased by 10% by increasing reliability by 10%; TK can 
be increased by 11.3% by decreasing CEP by 10%; and TK 
can be decreased by 3.8% by increasing hardness by 10%. 
From this it is clear, that reliability and CEP are the most 
sensitive variables. 
C. Richardson model 
The literature contains a variety of mathematical mod­
els16 that attempt to describe various aspects of the arms 
race. A physicst, Lewis Richardson, was one of the first 
(1919) to attempt a significant mode117 of the arms race 
based on the statistics of past wars. His model considered 
the action-reaction response of one nation to the threat of 
increased military spending by its adversary.The two-na­
tion model uses the coupled differential equations 
.x = ky + ax +g, 
Y= lx+by+h, 
where x and yare the armament levels of the tWb natkms, 
and a, b, k, I, g, and h are parameters. What is the signifi­
cance of the various terms in these equations? What signs 
would you expect for the various parameters? Derive a suf­
ficient condition for the parameters which would ensure a 
stable condition between the two adversaries. 
Answer: The first terms on the right in the equations are 
the "threat," or "reaction" terms and they represent the 
pressure on one nation to increase its armaments when its 
neighbor has armaments that can threaten its existence. 
Since the "defense coefficients" are positive (k and I > 0), 
the arms race would be exponentially unstable if we consi­
dered only the first terms in the equations. 
The second terms are the "economic burden" terms; the 
finiteness of labor, capital, and resources of a nation will 
reduce the predicted production rate of armaments. Since 
these "fatigue" or "expense" coefficients are negative (a 
and b <0), it is possible to have some stability in the arms 
race. 
The third terms are the constant "grievance," or "ambi­
tion" terms; the coefficients g and h are positive when the 
nations are dissatisfied and negative when they are satis­
fied. 
The condition for stability is determined by solving the 
first equation for y and then substitutingy and its derivative 
(V) into the second equation; we obtain 
oX - (a + b)X + (ab - kl)x = hk - bg. 
Depending on the magnitude (and sign) of the parameters, 
the result can be analogous to the differential equation for a 
damped spring and mass system in a gravitational field. 
Since both a and b <0, the xterm will damp but the oscilla­
tory solutions. If ab > kl, the arms race will have stable 
oscillations, and if ab < kl, the arms race will be uristable. 
In Richardson's analysis of these equations, he added the 
coordinates x and y in order to utilize normal coordinate 
solutions. 
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